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We analyze the importance of global shocks for the global economy and national policy 
makers. More specifically, we investigate whether monetary policy has become less 
effective in the wake of financial globalization. We also examine whether there is 
increasing uncertainty for central banks due to globalization-driven changes in the 
national economic structure. A FAVAR framework is applied to derive structural shocks 
on a worldwide level and their impact on other global and also national variables. We 
estimate our macro model using quarterly data from Q1 1984 to Q4 2007 for the G7 
countries plus the euro area. According to our results, global liquidity shocks are a 
driving force of the global economy and various national economies. However, some 
other shocks originating in house prices, GDP, technology and long-term interest rates 
play a role at the global level as well. These results prove to be robust across different 
specifications. Structural break tests indicate that global liquidity shocks have recently 
become more important as a determinant for house prices. In general, global variables 
have become more powerful over time in driving national variables. 
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1. Introduction 
Global economic integration has been spreading markedly in recent years. This is both 
true for goods and financial markets. Macroeconomic variables in one country should 
therefore increasingly reflect events occurring in the rest of the world. Even the housing 
sector, which is usually regarded as a national phenomenon, has seemingly become more 
synchronized across countries. As indicated by the latest events, strong rises in residential 
property prices in the US and some parts of Europe were followed by rapid declines. As 
national economies become more interconnected, a thorough understanding of the global 
economy and its effects on domestic economic activity is crucial. The ability to gauge the 
timing and the magnitude of international spillovers is of particular relevance, since it 
contributes to a better assessment of the development in one country or region. 
The rapid speed of globalization on goods and financial markets is beneficial, but 
may also have drawbacks for national policymakers. International spillovers and global 
shocks can limit the autonomy of national monetary and fiscal policy. For example, 
international capital flows are influencing national monetary conditions, thereby 
curtailing the ability of central banks to influence national real activity and prices. 
The questions we are investigating in this contribution are therefore threefold. 
First, what are the major shocks and transmission channels which are driving the global 
economy? Second, to what extent have global factors affected the determination of key 
macroeconomic variables in the G-7 countries? We quantify the speed and size of 
spillovers that occur following a shock originating from the global economy. Third, what 
can national economic policy do in the light of international spillovers and what should 
national policymakers do? More specifically, we investigate whether there is increasing 
uncertainty for monetary policy in the wake of globalization and whether there is a 
negative time trend in the effectiveness of national monetary policy when trying to steer 
national liquidity. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we relate our contribution to the 
literature and develop the global perspective before we turn to the selection of the data 
and variables in section 3. In section 4, we briefly explain the Factor-Augmented Vector 
Autoregression (FAVAR) methodology. In section 5, we display our estimation results -2- 
 
and the results of some tests for structural breaks and some robustness checks. Section 6 
finally concludes with some policy recommendations. 
2. “Going global” – global variables and a global perspective on shocks 
In this paper, we investigate the co-movements among some macro variables across the 
G7 and the euro-area countries with the aim to uncover the common driving forces 
shaping international macroeconomic dynamics and the features of their transmission 
mechanisms. For this purpose, we make use of a modified version of the Stock and 
Watson (2005a) Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregression (FAVAR) model. Our 
approach allows a more straightforward economic interpretation of the unobservable 
global factors. Our work is, on the one hand, related to the literature on global VARs 
(GVARs) and, on the other hand, to the research done on international business cycle co-
movement.  
2.1 FAVARs, GVARs and international business cycle co-movement 
Let us first delineate the notion of a SFAVAR against that of a GVAR model. A GVAR 
model is a compact model of the world economy designed to explicitly estimate the 
economic and financial interdependencies at national and international levels. Individual 
country/region specific vector error-correcting models are estimated, where the domestic 
variables are related to corresponding foreign variables constructed exclusively to match 
the international trade pattern of the country under consideration. The individual country 
models are then linked in a consistent manner so that the GVAR model is solved for the 
world as a whole. The degree of regional interdependence is investigated via generalized 
impulse response functions that portray the effects of shocks to a given variable in a 
given country/market on the rest of the world (Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner, 2004, 
and Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith, 2007). In our FAVAR, the econometric 
approach is less complicated and perhaps more straightforward. All global variables are 
modeled as endogenous in a structural VAR context. Spillover effects from global to 
national variables are possible, since there is a direct link between the global and the 
national level via the factor loadings. Global forces are regarded as exogenous to -3- 
 
domestic variables with no feedback effects possible.
1 Finally, in contrast to Pesaran et 
al. (2004), we choose the weighting in the construction of the common factors by using 
principal components analysis. 
Another series of papers has empirically checked the existence and significance of 
common patterns in the international dynamics of macro variables. The focus has been on 
the changes over time of business cycle synchronization across the most important 
economies originating in common global disturbances. Assessing international business 
cycle co-movement is mainly an empirical task and the main drivers of the development 
may shift over time. Usually, this literature has taken into account only a limited set of 
real quantities such as output, consumption and investment, which is, however, 
sometimes researched for a large number of countries (Stock and Watson 2005).  
When a broader range of variables is included in the analysis, the focus of the 
literature tends to switch from the common driving forces of fluctuations to the spillover 
of shocks. Many authors have investigated these issues.
2 Most of them detected a 
tendency for national business cycles to converge over the period of the second 
globalization. Artis and Okubo (2008) provide a long-run historical perspective which, by 
revisiting the era of the first globalization before the First World War, demonstrates a 
tendency for globalization to produce a high degree of synchronization in national 
business cycles. Stock and Watson (2005) conclude from their analysis that co-movement 
has fallen during the 1984–2002 period relative to 1960–83 due to the absence of 
common shocks. In this paper, we adopt a wider perspective and study co-movements 
among the G7-countries plus the euro area, using a larger data set than previously 
employed in the literature, including both real and nominal variables. 
In the seminal contribution of Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2008), more than 100 
countries are analyzed over the 1960-2005 period. Fluctuations in economic activity are 
decomposed into global, country group and country specific factors. During the second 
period of globalization (1985-2005), business cycles have converged among the group of 
                                                 
1 Not too different from our approach but in contrast to Bagliano and Morana (2009) who model all 
variables as endogenous from the outset, Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2007) model each country 
separately, with foreign variables treated as weakly exogenous. 
2 See for example Artis and Zhang (1997), Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003), Artis, Krolzig and Toro 
(2004), and Canova, Ciccarelli and Ortega (2006). -4- 
 
advanced economies and among the group of emerging market economies. But at the 
same time, the relative importance of the global factor has declined. Hence, there is 
evidence of cyclical convergence within each group, but for decoupling between them. 
Overall, there has been little change in the degree of international synchronization as 
measured by the joint contribution of the global and group-specific factors. However, this 
feature is quite consistent with an increased importance of common shocks as a driving 
force of international output fluctuations: the smaller magnitude of the shocks occurred 
since the early 1980s can explain a broadly constant pattern of correlations among GDP 
growth rates across countries (Bagliano and Morana, 2009, p. 432). In contrast to our 
study which imposes some structure on the global and national level, Kose, Otrok and 
Prasad (2008) do not make use of any structural model. Moreover, they confine 
themselves to the use of factor analysis. In our study, we move one step further by using 
FAVAR analysis, i.e. by integrating factor analysis into a VAR framework. 
As a stylized fact from the literature, common components appear to play a larger 
role in business cycles in those advanced economies which are the focus of our paper. In 
contrast, country specific factors are relatively more important for emerging market 
economies (Kose, Otrok and Whiteman, 2003). One reason for this result might be that 
many emerging market economies in contrast to the industrialized countries have only 
reached intermediate levels of financial integration, i.e. they have not been able to 
achieve improved risk sharing over the globalization period (Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 
2007). 
Our work is related to that conducted by Bagliano and Morana (2009). In their 
paper, international co-movements among a set of key real and nominal macroeconomic 
variables in the US, UK, Canada, Japan and the euro area have been investigated for the 
1980–2005 period, using a factor vector autoregressive approach. They deliver empirical 
evidence that co-movements in macroeconomic variables do not only concern real 
activity, but are an important feature also of stock market returns, inflation rates, interest 
rates and, to a smaller extent, monetary aggregates. Both common sources of shocks and 
similar transmission mechanisms explain international co-movements, with the only 
exception of Japan, where the idiosyncratic features seem to dominate. Finally, -5- 
 
concerning the origin of global shocks, evidence of both global supply-side and demand-
side disturbances is found. 
However, our work differs from Bagliano and Morana (2009) in three major 
aspects. First, we explicitly analyze the structural relationship between various global 
variables in order to get a better understanding of the world economy. This part is 
missing in Bagliano and Morana (2009). Instead, the authors concentrate on four global 
factors which they label “inflation factor”, “output growth factor”, “stock return factor” 
and “oil price factor”. For example, the inflation factor contains not only inflation rates 
but also interest rates as well as monetary aggregates. In our approach, the relationships 
between such common forces are explicitly disentangled via a structural model on a 
global level. We use a total of seven global factors, including a “house price factor”. The 
latter enables us to investigate to what extent other global variables contributed to the 
strong rise in property prices until the start of the financial crisis.  
Second, we examine spillover effects from global to national variables using 
structural VARs for the G-7 countries plus the euro area. In contrast to Bagliano and 
Morana (2009), we do not estimate one model with all national variables taken as 
endogenous but implement separate VARs for each country or region. Hence, we 
intentionally neglect feedback effects between countries. Bagliano and Morana identify 
structural idiosyncratic shocks by imposing exclusion restrictions on their 
contemporaneous impact on all national variables across countries, estimating a total of 
43 parameters in each equation (including the four factors). Our main motivation to apply 
an approach different from theirs is that modeling both global and all national variables in 
one complete structural framework would have been too costly in terms of degrees of 
freedom. Hence, the typical empirical trade-off between using a “sufficient” number of 
structural factors on a global level and establishing structural links between national 
variables for various countries emerges once again.
3 
                                                 
3 We use seven factors with a lag length of 2, thereby leading to the estimate of fourteen coefficients on the 
global level (plus a constant and a deterministic component). Our sample covers the period from Q1 1984 
to Q4 2007. Bagliano and Morana base their specification on four factors with only one lag (sample Q1 
1980 – Q2 2005).  -6- 
 
Third, we are examining whether structural breaks emerge on a global level but 
also in the relation between global and national variables. In our view, this is of special 
interest for national policy-makers, as they are supposed to react in a timely and 
consistent manner when national economies are hit by global shocks.  
2.2 Global variables and a "theory" of global shocks 
Let us now turn to why we make use of specific global variables and to adhere to a theory 
of global shocks in the context of our paper. In most of the literature, there is a focus on 
commodity prices and real GDP when defining global shocks. However, we would like to 
argue that it can also make sense to think in terms of other macroeconomic and financial 
variables as global ones. More specifically, we investigate whether and to what extent 
international co-movements concern not only real economic activity but also nominal 
variables like, for example, monetary aggregates and interest rates and provide an 
economic interpretation for the sources of common dynamics. We feel legitimized to do 
so by keeping an eye on the main empirical pattern of the most recent financial and 
economic crisis which is commonly modeled as a global demand shock and has been 
characterized by a synchronous downturn of house prices (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, 2009). Our main focus in this paper is on the concept of global monetary 
liquidity and of global short-term interest rates. Nevertheless, we also find significant 
global house price shocks, technology shocks and long-term interest rate shocks. Let us 
first address global monetary liquidity.  
It is usually argued that there is a global money market only under a fixed 
exchange rate system. By pegging the value of domestic currency to a foreign currency, 
central banks make foreign currency a perfect substitute for domestic currency on the 
supply side. Should the monetary authority in one country increase the money supply, the 
domestic money supply would exceed domestic money demand. As a result, money flows 
out through the balance of payments. The domestic balance-of-payments deficit must be 
matched by a balance-of-payments surplus abroad. Thus, money supplies abroad must 
also increase. Flexible exchange rates are assumed to eliminate this source of monetary 
interdependence. National money becomes a non-tradable asset whose relative price (the 
exchange rate) is assumed to be determined freely in foreign exchange markets. In -7- 
 
contrast with the fixed exchange rate system in which each country’s money supply was 
endogenous, it is determined exogenously by monetary authorities. Under flexible rates, 
the balance of payments is always zero, i.e. there is no net money flow between central 
banks. Flexible rates therefore make currencies perfect non-substitutes on the supply side. 
However, the insular property of floating exchange rates may break down when there is 
currency substitution. Some investors might consider domestic and foreign currencies as 
relatively close substitutes. Currency substitution suggests that the demand for domestic 
money is dependent on external factors. If domestic residents hold portfolios containing 
both foreign and domestic assets and reallocate these portfolios according to changes in 
the relative opportunity costs of these assets, foreign monetary shocks will alter the 
relative costs of holding a given portfolio. This in turn induces residents to reallocate 
their portfolios between domestic and foreign assets. The readjustment of currency 
holdings enables monetary shocks to be transmitted via money demand from one 
economy to another even in a world of flexible exchange rates.  
In addition, Rüffer and Stracca (2006) argue that apart from currency substitution 
money has to be characterized as endogenous. For this purpose, they modify the standard 
portfolio balance model by assuming that the key rate of the central bank is exogenous 
and domestic money holding is endogenous, i.e. money-demand driven (and dependent 
on foreign interest rates, as investors hold foreign bonds). Hence, one can think of direct 
spillover effect in monetary aggregates from abroad if the national money supply is 
endogenous, i.e. driven by money demand and not by money supply via central banks. 
Consider the case of an expansionary monetary policy in the foreign country 
which we capture by a reduction in foreign interest rates. As a first consequence, foreign 
investors shift out of foreign bonds and into foreign money due to the reduced 
opportunity costs of monetary balances. As a second step, the reduction in foreign interest 
rates raises the relative attractiveness of domestic money and bonds for domestic agents. 
If the elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the foreign interest rate is larger 
than the elasticity of the demand for domestic bonds, then the money holdings in the 
domestic country increase. -8- 
 
Monetary liquidity spillovers across countries could have serious implications for 
central banks and national macroeconomic and financial variables as well. For example, 
monetary liquidity spillovers may lead to a global cycle in house prices. The same could 
be true for a common pattern in inflation and share prices. 
According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the dramatic increase in 
international financial integration has been one of the salient global economic 
developments in recent years. Countries have accumulated substantial cross-border 
holdings and there have been sizable shifts in the composition of asset and liability 
positions. The size of countries’ external portfolios is now such that fluctuations in 
exchange rates and asset prices cause very significant reallocations of wealth across 
countries. This creates a huge potential for international capital flows, thereby influencing 
monetary conditions in other countries as well. We now briefly address our concept of a 
"global short-term interest rate". 
Of course, there is no world central bank which sets the short-term interest rate for 
many countries. However, from this quite trivial insight, it cannot be concluded that 
interest rate shocks cannot be identified on a global level. If a global cycle exists in the 
world economy and in housing markets, the money market rates should move 
synchronously as well, since national monetary policies react directly or indirectly to 
global developments: directly, in the sense that global variables enter the central bank’s 
reaction function (via world GDP and/or global excess liquidity); indirectly, if monetary 
policy does not react until global variables have an effect on national patterns (global 
excess liquidity spills over into national monetary aggregates). Our "global interest rate 
shocks" can then be interpreted as unexpected changes in this reaction pattern. In the 
literature, common beliefs and peer pressure are mentioned as additional reasons for a 
similar reaction pattern of central banks, i.e. national monetary policies react quite 
similarly across borders via meetings and the exchange of information among central 
banks (implicit policy coordination). For example, the establishment of inflation targeting 
regimes in the majority of industrialized countries might serve as an example of 
"common beliefs" in this respect. -9- 
 
3. Data and variables 
In our FAVAR analysis, we use quarterly time series from Q1 1984 to Q4 2007 for the 
G7-countries plus the euro area, i.e. the US, Japan, the UK and Canada and the EMU. 
Hence, 48.9% of global GDP in 2007 is represented in our empirical analysis.
4 In 
principle, one could argue that emerging markets have become increasingly important for 
the global economy and international financial markets. However, we opted for a focus 
on major industrialized countries for three reasons. First, the majority of emerging 
markets have a fixed exchange rate regime which makes monetary spillover effect likely, 
according to the traditional trilemma view. The motivation of our study is to examine 
whether such monetary spillovers can also occur despite flexible exchange rates. Second, 
there are data availability problems even for bigger emerging markets. Third, as already 
mentioned in section 2, common components appear to play a larger role in business 
cycles in advanced economies than in emerging market economies, where country-
specific factors tend to be more important. 
Why are global liquidity shocks important in our context and by far no artifact? 
Some critics might argue that global liquidity, as measured in one currency, can only 
change in quantitative terms if one assumes a fixed exchange rate system worldwide. 
Note, however, that international liquidity spillover effects may occur regardless of the 
exchange rate system. Under pegged exchange rate regimes, official foreign exchange 
interventions result in a transmission of monetary policy shocks from one country to 
another. In a system of flexible exchange rates, the validity of the "uncovered interest rate 
parity" (UIP) relationship should in theory prevent cross-border monetary spillover. 
According to this theory, the expected appreciation of the low-yielding currency in terms 
of the high-yielding currency should be equal to the difference between (risk-adjusted) 
interest rates in the two economies. 
However, the violation of the UIP - often referred to as the “forward premium 
puzzle”- is a common empirical finding in the literature on macroeconomics and finance. 
The enduring existence of carry trades can be taken as evidence that exchange rates 
diverge from fundamentals for lengthy periods, as the exposure of a carry trade position 
                                                 
4 Own calculations based on IMF PPP data.  -10- 
 
involves a bet that UIP does not hold over the investment period. Moreover, currency 
substitution may enable international liquidity spillovers in a framework of flexible 
exchange rates. These international adjustments of money holdings allow the 
transmission of monetary shocks from one economy to another (via money demand) even 
in a system of flexible exchange rates. 
The time series for the G7 plus the euro zone are drawn from a variety of sources, 
including various national statistical offices, central banks and the OECD. Most time 
series are provided by professional databanks like Thomson Datastream, Feri and 
Bloomberg. Since EMU series at a quarterly frequency are often available only for a 
relatively short time-span, we partly rely on the Area-Wide Model database by Fagan, 
Henry and Mestre (2001) who provide backdated time series. Hence, some caution is 
warranted, as there are methodological differences across euro-zone countries in 
collecting the data. Moreover, data availability on a national level becomes increasingly 
scarce when moving back in time. Historical house prices for the EMU stem from Gros 
(2007). 
We estimate our baseline FAVAR model including the following variables for the 
G7-countries plus the non G7-member euro-area countries: real GDP, four inflation 
measures (CPI, PPI, import prices and GDP deflator), 3-month short-term interest rates, 
broad monetary aggregates (typically, M2 or M3), two commodity price indices (HWWI 
and CRB), house prices and share prices (national MSCI). A complete data list with 
sources can be found in Table A7 in the appendix.  
4. The FAVAR methodology 
The empirical value added from our approach stems from the use of a Factor Augmented 
VAR (FAVAR). A FAVAR is the combination of a standard VAR model with factor 
analysis. Global variables were derived by using factor analysis. We regard this 
procedure as superior compared to a simple aggregation of national variables for two 
reasons. Simple sum aggregation implicitly assumes that the included national variables 
are perfect substitutes. However, given differences in national measurement, this does not 
need to be true. For example, the monetary aggregate M2 in the US is not a perfect -11- 
 
substitute for M3 in the euro zone. In contrast, factors are latent variables which measure 
the "underlying process". The rationale is that the behavior of several (national) variables 
is driven by a few common (global) forces, the factors. Hence, the latter can provide an 
exhaustive summary of the information included in data across countries and regions. 
Moreover, and in contrast to simple aggregation, factor analysis allows the 
distinction between common forces and idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. the amount in the 
measured data which is not considered to be part of the underlying global forces. 
Idiosyncratic components mean that the measured variables can include changes which 
are exclusively the result of a national data-generating process. Instead, if global 
variables are derived by aggregation, the distinction between idiosyncratic and global 
shocks is blurred. Any idiosyncratic shock stemming from one (major) country will 
inevitably influence the global aggregate and will therefore be counted as a common 
shock across countries. Global and idiosyncratic shocks are presumed to have the same 
influence, although idiosyncratic shocks should not influence the common movement in 
an economic sense. 
The use of the FAVAR methodology is especially appealing in the light of 
spillovers and global shocks, since it allows both examining the interaction of global 
variables and their effects on national variables. For example, it is possible to derive the 
impact of a global liquidity shock on global GDP, global commodity, house and share 
prices, global inflation, etc. Different types of shocks can therefore be put to some kind of 
a "horse-race": Is a global liquidity shock more important for the global economy than a 
global commodity price or global interest rate shock? At the same time, the response of 
every national variable included in the respective global factor (national CPI, national 
money supply, interest rate, share price, etc.) due to a global shock (liquidity, GDP, 
commodity, etc.) can be examined.  
The problem in expanding the external sector (in a VAR model) is that there is a 
rapid increase in the number of parameters that need to be estimated with the addition of 
each economy as well as the addition of each sector of the respective economy. The 
established approach adopted to circumvent this problem of over-parameterization is to -12- 
 
specify latent factors which capture the overall dynamic features of the international 
economies (Fry, 2004).  
Recent work with Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregression (FAVAR) suggests 
that standard VAR analysis can be improved by incorporating the information in a large 
number of macroeconomic series. A general formulation of the dynamic factor model is 
it t i it f L X     ) (
t i ,..., 1 
 with   as the observed data for the macroeconomic time series i at 
time   for   and  . If the lag polynomials 
it X
t N T ,..., 1  ) (L i   are assumed to have 
finite orders, the equation can be written in static form:  t t X t F     . Hence, the factor 
 can be thought of as a weighted average of the variables in a data set. The factor 
loadings  , i.e. the weights, can be either positive or negative and reflect how correlated 
each variable is with the factor.  , 
t F

t F  and  t   are not directly observable and have to be 
estimated. To separate factors from idiosyncratic disturbances, the following identifying 
assumptions are made (Justiniano, 2003):  




t ,..., 1 , ) (      j i  . Usually, 
the assumption of no cross-correlation is relaxed. The model is then said to have an 
approximate factor structure.  




t ,..., 1 ,    j k  . However, factors can 
be correlated in time. 




t ,..., 1     K j ,..., 1 
These assumptions imply that all co-movements across variables are attributed 
exclusively to a set of orthogonal factors. Stock and Watson (1998, 2002) show that the 
factors in a model of the form  t t t v F X     can be consistently estimated by principal 
component analysis when the time series dimension (T) and the cross-section dimension 
(N) are large. The factors are extracted in a sequential fashion, with the first factor 
explaining the most variation in the data set, the second factor explaining the next most 
variation (not explained by the first factor), and so on.  -13- 
 
The dynamic factor model in VAR form (FAVAR) can be obtained by combining 
factor analysis (equation 1) with a VAR model (equation 2):  
(1)  t t t t v X L D F X     1 ) ( 
(2)  t t t G F L F     1 ) ( 
where  qp r q    with r  static factors  and   dynamic factors.   is a  t F q  r n  
matrix,  is a   matrix lag polynomial of order  ,  ) (L D n n p ) (L   is a  r r  matrix lag 
polynomial of order  p ,   is  G q r ,  t   is a r -variate vector of global shocks driving the 
common factors,   equals a  -variate vector of idiosyncratic shocks. Substituting the 
factor evolution equation (2) into equation (1) and collecting terms yields the complete 
FAVAR form: 
t v n











































































The FAVAR contains the exclusion restriction implied by factor analysis, i.e.   
does not predict   given  . Restrictions of this form closely resemble the 
assumption of exogenous world variables which are used to identify global shocks in 
open economy VARs. The FAVAR can be estimated via a two-step principal component 
approach. In the first step, the common components   are estimated using the first 
t X
t F 1 ) (   t F L
t F r  
principal components of  . In the second step, a VAR is estimated on these common 
components. Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) point out that this two-step approach 
implies the presence of “generated regressors” in the second step. However, the 
uncertainty in the factor estimates should be negligible when N is large relative to T.  
t X
In the first step, estimates of the common factors are obtained by dividing the data 
set   into categories of variables. These categories are capturing different dimensions of 
the economy across countries ( : economic activity as reflected by real 
GDP; inflation which include consumer prices, producer prices, import prices and the 
GDP deflator; commodity prices which include the HWWI and the CRB commodity 
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monetary aggregates, like M2 or M3; short-term interest rates which include 3M interest 
rates; and share prices which include the MSCI share price index in domestic currency. 
Estimates for the global factors are obtained as the first principal component for each 
sub-set (category) of series. Each segment of   is therefore explained by exactly one 
factor. For example, global monetary liquidity is estimated as the first principal 


































































































In the second step, a VAR with the estimated   is implemented. The 
innovations in the VAR model can be identified by applying standard procedures, like a 
Cholesky decomposition. However, a simple recursive ordering may not be appropriate in 
an international context. Given its low level of flexibility, one has inevitably to make 
extreme assumptions about the interaction between global variables. For example, if one 
puts global money before the global short-term interest rate, the interest elasticity of 
global money demand is constrained to be zero. In contrast, if the global interest rate is 
predetermined for global money, money supply’s interest elasticity is assumed to be zero 
(Leeper and Roush, 2003). As a result, the derived monetary policy shocks might be 
contaminated. Non-recursive schemes allow for more general contemporaneous 
interactions among variables than recursive orderings. A global structural FAVAR 
(SFAVAR) postulates more reasonable economic structures and reflects better the 
complexities of international policy-making. 
) ,..., , (
2 1 I
t t t F F F
We see two major advantages by implementing a FAVAR in our context. First, it 
is possible to derive structural shocks on a worldwide level and their impact on other 
global variables. For example, global money demand shocks can be disentangled from 
global money supply shocks. Second, it is possible to derive the effects of each global 
shock on specific national variables (cf. equation 3). Hence, impulse response functions 
can be constructed for any variable included in the informational data set ( ).  t X-15- 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Baseline FAVAR 
The common factors are estimated by principal component analysis. As is common in 
factor model applications, the variables are initially de-trended and standardized. Apart 
from the short-term interest rates, all   are log first-differenced. For the short-term 
interest rates only, first differences are calculated. Afterwards, all the de-trended 
variables are standardized so that each of them has a mean of zero and a variance of one. 
Otherwise, the results would have been systematically affected by cross-country 
differences in variability. 
t X
For each global variable, the proportion of the total variance of the series 
attributable to each principal component is calculated. For the first principal component 
(PC1) to suitably qualify as a factor capturing international co-movement, one important 
condition must be met. PC1 should explain a sufficiently large fraction of the total 
variance of the relevant data set in comparison to the remaining principal components of 
higher order. As can be seen in the table below, the requirements are met for all of the 
common factors. For example, in the case of global money, a significant part of the total 
variance (48.6%) can be attributed to the first principal component. In contrast, PC2 
accounts for only 18%. Even for the inflation factor which includes four different 
measures of inflation for each country or region (CPI, PPI, import prices and the GDP 
deflator), the first principal component’s share is 31.8% compared to 16.9% for PC2. 
With 55.9% and 74.3%, the PC1’s share for commodity and share prices is clearly the 
highest.  
Table 1 - Share of variance explained by first three principal components 
PC1 PC2 PC3
Real GDP 36.5 23.0 17.0
Inflation 31.8 16.9 9.6
Commodity prices 55.9 27.8 7.9
House prices 33.2 26.9 15.5
Broad money 48.6 18.0 15.0
3M interest rate 42.8 19.7 18.5
Share price 74.3 12.1 6.4
Note: Calculations based on first standardized differences  -16- 
 
We conclude that common forces exist which qualify as global factors in the 
global economy and on international financial markets. The seven global factors are 
therefore used for estimating a SFAVAR in levels including a constant and a time trend.
5 
Since the global factors have been obtained in first-differences, they are "re-constructed" 
in levels by setting each global factor equal to zero in the first quarter of 1984 and 
calculating the cumulative sum of the first principal components. In order to identify the 
global structural shocks, the following assumptions are made:  
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with  as the vector of errors in the reduced-form equations and   as the global 
structural shocks. The global GDP (YR) and the global house price factor (HP) are not 
influenced contemporaneously by any other global variable. The global inflation factor 
(PI) is affected contemporaneously only by the commodity price factor (CP). The latter is 
affected at the same time by all other common factors apart from inflation. The global 
money factor is influenced contemporaneously by the global GDP and inflation factor 
and by the short-term interest rate (SR) as well. For the reaction function of central banks' 
worldwide, it is assumed that they react contemporaneously to commodity prices, the 
global house price factor and global money, but not to the global activity and inflation 
factor due to time lags in publication. Given the forward-looking nature of financial 
markets, share prices (SP) respond to all other global variables at the same time. 
u
To determine the lag length, we apply the usual criteria such as the Likelihood 
Ratio test, the Final Prediction Error, the Akaike information criterion, the Schwarz 
criterion and the Hannan-Quinn criterion. Most of the criteria point at a lag length of two, 
which is also sufficient to avoid serial correlation among the residuals and seems to be 
                                                 
5 Since we now impose some structure on the global economy, we introduce the notion of a SFAVAR 
instead that of a pure FAVAR analysis. -17- 
 
appropriate in order to estimate a model which is parsimonious where possible. The LR 
test for overidentified VARs suggests that our short-run restrictions cannot be rejected at 
any conventional confidence level. The statistic is equal to 5.1 and the corresponding p-
value is 0.17.  
The major result of our structural factor augmented vector autoregression 
(SFVAR) model is that global liquidity shocks are driving forces of the global economy 
and various national economies. Moreover, the outcomes of our empirical analysis are in 
line with economic theory, since frequently emerging puzzles as, for example, the "price 
puzzle" and the "liquidity puzzle" do not appear in our case. As can be seen in the charts 
below, a global liquidity shock has a significant positive impact on global GDP after six 
quarters. As always, the solid line in each chart represents the response to a one-standard 
deviation shock, again measured in standard deviations. The dashed lines represent the 
95% confidence intervals bootstrapped by ourselves based on a standard residual 
bootstrap procedure with 500 draws (Enders, 2004). 
Furthermore, global inflation responds significantly with a considerable time lag 
of 11 quarters to a global liquidity shock. However, in contrast to our findings for global 
GDP, the inflationary effect is far more persistent. Strong responses can also be found for 
the common house price and the short-term interest rate factor. The global house price 
factor rises strongly and persistently without any delay. This may indicate that excess 
liquidity on a worldwide level has contributed to the phase of exceptionally high 
increases in residential property prices across countries. Global liquidity shocks also lead 
to a marked liquidity effect, driving short-term interest rates down by up to one standard 
deviation.  
All in all, our impulse response analysis seems to confirm the results found by 
Rüffer and Stracca (2006) and Belke, Orth and Setzer (2008) on the basis of global 
VARs. Common liquidity disturbances are influencing major macro variables on an 
international level. However, with respect to asset prices, our results show some marked 
differences versus previous empirical work. We are not able to find any significant 
impact both on commodity and share prices, whereas Belke, Orth and Setzer (2008) 
report a significant response of commodity prices after a global liquidity shock. A recent -18- 
 
study conducted by Alessi, Detken (2009) finds that global measures of liquidity, like the 
M1 gap and the private credit gap, are useful early warning indicators for aggregate asset 
price booms in OECD countries. Their asset price measure includes house prices as well 
as commercial property and share prices.  
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 SFAVAR: Global liquidity -> global share price
 -19- 
 
Apart from a common liquidity driving force, global demand and house price 
shocks prove to be important as well. For example, a sudden change in the global GDP 
disturbance leads to temporary higher inflation from quarter two to quarter eleven. 
Significant responses of common factors can also be found after a global house price 
shock. In contrast, the common short-term interest rate is not a driving but a driven force 
in the global economy. For example, an interest rate shock does not trigger any 
significant response of the common house price factor. Instead, a sudden change in the 
disturbance of residential property prices leads to an increasing short-term interest rate. 
The same insignificant results are found for the inflation factor and commodity and share 
prices (see Table A1 for more results). 
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In order to investigate the effects of global and idiosyncratic structural shocks on 
national variables, we estimate equation (3), using a separate VAR for each country or 
region. The variables in levels are again “re-constructed” by calculating the cumulative 
sum of the standardized national variables. This is necessary to be fully consistent with 
our approach on the global level. Since a national economy can be hit by both global and 
idiosyncratic shocks, one has to distinguish between these two effects. We do so by 
regressing  Xt   which consists of global and idiosyncratic disturbances on the global 
structural shocks ( ) derived from equation (5). On the basis of the obtained 
idiosyncratic components, restrictions can be imposed for exact identification on a 
national level (Bagliano and Morana, 2009). Again, we refrain from using a Cholesky 
decomposition and implement structural relationships between the respective variables as 
follows:  
t u
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with   as the vector of errors in the reduced-form equations and   as the 
idiosyncratic structural disturbances. Our restrictions on a national level largely resemble 
the assumptions we made for global variables. For example, GDP (YR) and house prices 
(HP) are not influenced contemporaneously by other national variables. The inflation 
figure (PI) equals consumer prices and is affected only by the real effective exchange rate 
(ER) at the same time. The latter variable and share prices (SP) are assumed to respond 
contemporaneously to all other variables.  
v z
Before presenting the structural impulse response functions, some cautionary 
remarks in interpreting the results seem to be appropriate. The identification pattern in 
equation (6) is used for all countries included in the sample, although they differ 
markedly in economic size. In addition, various institutional settings in national monetary -21- 
 
and fiscal policy exist. Second, deriving the impact of global shocks on national variables 
is rather costly in terms of degrees of freedom. Since our SFAVAR contains seven factors 
and seven national variables with two lags each, 30 parameters (including a constant and 
a deterministic component) have to be estimated per equation. Bagliano and Morana 
(2009) estimate a total of even 43 coefficients by using a sample (only) ranging from Q1 
1980 to Q2 2005.  
In the following, we focus on the effects of global money supply (or what we 
label “global liquidity shocks”) on national variables. As has been the case before, we 
bootstrap the confidence bands on the basis of a residual bootstrap with 500 draws. 
Accordingly, global liquidity disturbances have a significant impact on broad national 
monetary aggregates in the US, the EMU and Canada. However, the effects differ, 
thereby indicating that various national transmission mechanisms are at work. In the UK 
and Japan no significant impact of global liquidity shocks on national money supplies can 
be found.  
Global liquidity shocks also trigger significant responses of other major 
macroeconomic variables in some countries, like real GDP, consumer prices, house 
prices and short term interest rates. A detailed overview on a country level is included in 
Table A2 in the Appendix. For example, real GDP in the euro area reacts positively after 
a time lag of seven quarters. In order to get a yardstick, we derive the response of EMU 
GDP after a structural idiosyncratic money supply shock as well. The impulse response 
function displays a rather similar dynamic but is somewhat more pronounced in its 
impact on real GDP. House prices in the US are strongly affected by global liquidity 
shocks, whereas national money supply disturbances play a comparatively small role. 
Hence, we suspect that the bubble in the US residential property market in recent years 
can not only be explained by exceptionally low short term and long term interest rates but 
by excessive global liquidity as well. Interestingly, global liquidity shocks do not seem to 
be a major driver for the housing market in the euro area. In contrast, idiosyncratic 
disturbances to the money supply lead to strongly rising residential property prices in the 
EMU. -22- 
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5.2. Additional global shocks 
Our SFAVAR focuses on global forces, like monetary liquidity, inflation, share prices, 
etc. However, there could be other variables which also play a role in the global 
economy. Hence, we look for the influence of two other forces which may influence our 
SFAVAR approach: technology and long-term interest rates. The importance of 
technology shocks is stressed in the real business cycle theory (RBC) and in the 
endogenous growth literature. There may be international knowledge spillover effects, 
like the import of goods that embody new technologies, FDI flows, joint ventures and the 
migration of key personnel (Klenow, Rodriguez-Clare 2004). Especially trade-related 
new-good externalities could be central in transmitting new technologies from one 
country to another. New goods of higher quality are introduced and then imitated by other 
companies worldwide.  
The second global force which could be interesting is the behavior of long-term 
interest rates. Instead of global excess liquidity, the shortage of financial assets could 
have played a central role in shaping the global economy in recent years (Caballero, 
2006). Emerging markets' FX reserves have been surging under the so-called Bretton 
Woods II system. Given increasing global demand for financial assets and limited supply 
by industrialized countries, long-term interest rates fell to historically low levels. In 
addition, the phenomenon of petrodollar recycling from commodity-exporting countries 
exerted further downward pressure on real interest rates. This in turn could have 
contributed to the strong rise in house prices in many countries.  
In order to derive technology shocks, we use the identification pattern proposed 
by Galí (Galí 1999). This procedure has been discussed intensively in the last few years 
in the RBC literature. Accordingly, there are technology and non-technology shocks 
which are orthogonal to each other. Galí’s basic identifying assumption is that technology 
innovations are the only shocks which have an effect on the long-run level of labor 
productivity. Assuming that both variations in the log productivity ( ) and log hours 
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where   and   equal the technology and the non-technology innovations, 
respectively. Since Galí (1999) assumes that the unit root in productivity stems 
exclusively from technology shocks, the matrix of long-run multipliers is lower triangular 
(0 ). In order to estimate this approach on a global level, the following five-step 
procedure is pursued. First, labor productivity figures for the G-7 plus euro zone are 








6 Second, the obtained figures for labor productivity and total employee 
hours are standardized on the basis of first differences with a mean of zero and a variance 
of one. Third, global forces for labor productivity and hours worked are estimated by 
deriving the first principal component (PC1) each. Accordingly, for labor productivity the 
proportion of the total variance attributable to PC1 is 26.1% compared to 22.5% for PC2. 
For total hours worked, PC1’s share is 38.3% (PC2: 22.7%). Fourth, we “re-construct” 
the two first principal components in levels by setting each global factor zero in Q1 1984 
and calculating the cumulative sum. Fifth, we apply a battery of unit root tests (Dickey-
Fuller; Phillips-Perron; Kwiatkowski, et. al., Elliot et. al.; Ng and Perron) for global 
productivity and global hours worked. Accordingly, the majority of unit root tests 
indicates that global productivity is integrated of order one. With respect to global hours 
worked, the empirical evidence is more mixed, with some tests indicating integration of 
order one or being stationary. Hence, concerning hours, equation (7) is estimated both in 
levels and first differences. All lag criteria point lag to a length of one. After deriving the 
global technology innovation, the following equation is estimated:  
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with   as global structural shocks derived from our SFAVAR (cf. equation 5) 




                                                 
6 A series for total hours worked in the EMU is not available to our knowledge. We therefore construct the 
EMU figure as the sum of hours worked in the following countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Finland. On basis of PPP weights provided by the IMF, our measure 
covers 89% of total EMU GDP in 2007. -25- 
 
the technology innovations do not have an impact on the global structural shocks within 
the first four quarters, i.e.  ,  ,  ,   and   are jointly equal to zero. A constant in 
equation (8) is neglected since its influence proved to be non-significant. The results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected for five of the seven global innovations. Apart 
from the global money and the short-term interest rate shock, all innovations in the 
FAVAR are contaminated by technology shocks. This is true independent of whether 
total hours worked are modeled as stationary time series or integrated of order one. 
Interestingly, the coefficient signs are not always in line with economic theory. For 
example, global technology shocks have a positive impact on global inflation. It is not 
clear whether this result is triggered by another common force behind technological 
innovations or due to the specification suggested by Galí (1999). 
0 c 1 c 2 c 3 c 4 c
Table 2 - Testing for omitted global technology shocks in the SFAVAR 




























effici Hours (I(0)) Significant Coefficients
GDP 3.04** 5 **; c2 2* 3.29*** c0=-0.16**; c1=0.14**; c2=0.13*
Inflation 2.04* 2.25* c0=0.54**; c1=0.64*
Commodity prices 1.95* 2.22* c0=0.40**; c1=0.35*
House prices 2.39** 5 3 1* 1.96* c1=-0.11*
Monetary liquidity 1.82 1.37 ---
3M interest rates 1.16 1.26 ---
Share prices 2.96** 8 **; c2 ** 2.83** c0=-0.30*; c1=-0.35*; c2=0.41**
Note 1: F-statistics from Wald tests





The same type of Wald tests in equation (8) are repeated for long-term interest 
rate shocks. Hence, a principal component analysis for 10Y government bond yields is 
done.
7 Accordingly, PC1 amounts to a high 66% (PC2: 13.9%). Again, we “re-construct” 
the PC1 in levels by setting the global interest rate factor zero in Q1 1984 and calculating 
the cumulative sum. An equation is estimated with the global interest rate factor as 
dependent variable and the common forces used in the SFAVAR (GDP, inflation, 
commodity, house prices, liquidity, short-term interest rates and share prices) as 
independent ones. As is the case in our baseline FAVAR, a lag length of two is chosen. 
The obtained residuals are taken as a proxy for the global interest rate disturbance for the 
Wald tests. Accordingly, common long-term interest rate shocks seem to play an 
important role in the global economy. Of the seven common disturbances in the 
                                                 
7 In the case of Japan, the average maturity for government bonds is used for data availability reasons.  -26- 
 
SFAVAR, five are significantly influenced by long-term interest rate shocks. This stands 
in stark contrast to the negligible effects of non-systematic variations in the global short-
term interest rate factor.  
Two additional results are worth noting. First, our derived common liquidity 
shock is at least partly driven by changes in the long-term interest rate disturbance. Our 
FAVAR therefore contains not only a pure common money supply shock but some 
interest-rate sensitive elements as well. In line with theory, the obtained coefficient is 
negative, i.e. there is an inverse relationship between the shock components of the 
common money and the long-term interest rate factor. Second, the global house price 
disturbance is not driven by long-term interest rate shocks. This is a surprising result, 
given the discussion of the interest rate conundrum’s impact on the boom and bust of 
residential property prices. Independent of the concrete reasons, we regard both the role 
of international knowledge spillovers and the global long-term interest rate factor as an 
interesting field for further empirical research.  
Table 3 - Testing for omitted long-term interest rate shocks in SFAVAR 
Global structural shocks Long-term interest rate Significant Coefficients
GDP 1.72 ---
Inflation 5.59*** c0=0.65***
Commodity prices 6.69*** c0=0.56***
House prices 0.24 ---
Monetary liquidity 2.28* c0=-0.17***
3M interest rates 4.00*** c0=0.23***
Share prices 2.48** c0=-0.36***
Note 1: F-statistics from Wald tests
Note 2: *** Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level  
5.3. Structural breaks 
In the last 25 years, the global economy and international financial markets underwent a 
number of profound changes. For example, world trade increased by 658% between 1984 
and 2007. According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), cross-border holdings of 
financial assets in the G-7 countries rose from 116% of GDP in 1990 to 261% in 2004 -27- 
 
(last available data point)
8. Moreover, there may have been regime switches in central 
bank behavior. Apart from structural time variations (propagation), the variance of 
exogenous shocks could have changed as well. All in all, it is rather unlikely that the data 
generating process in 1984 is the same as in 2007. This in turn could undermine the 
stability of our SFAVAR. We therefore examine three types of structural breaks: in the 
factor dynamics ( ), in the global shocks (  t G ) and in the factor loadings ().
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Equation (9) allows the global SFAVAR coefficients and the global structural shocks to 
break at potentially different dates (  and   respectively).  


















In equation (10), it is allowed for a break in the factor loadings at date .  
We start by testing jointly for the stability of all the coefficients on the lags of a 
given global variable using the Andrews-Quandt structural breakpoint test. In contrast to 
the traditional Chow test, this structural change test does not assume any prior knowledge 
about potential break dates. Instead, the Andrews-Quandt sup-F statistic is the maximum 
of a sequence of traditional Chow tests for structural change each based on a different 
potential breakpoint. As is common in the literature, we applied a heteroskedasticity-
robust version of the Andrews-Quandt test (Stock, Watson 2002). The range of the 
sample is trimmed by 15% from each side. Of the seven tests performed, none rejects the 
null hypothesis of stability at conventional confidence levels. Moreover, additional 
Andrews-Quandt tests are implemented separately for three variables in each of the seven 
SFAVAR equations: global monetary liquidity, global GDP and global house prices. 
Given the previously obtained empirical evidence, we regard these three variables as 
short-run driving forces of the global economy. Only in the global liquidity equation do 
                                                 
8 The world trade statistic and the readings for financial cross-border holdings stem from the IMF and Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), respectively. Both figures are our own calculations.  
9 The dynamics   on a national level and the idiosyncratic errors   may undergo profound changes as 
well. These types of time variation are neglected in our work.  
) (L D t v-28- 
 
signs of structural instability emerge. In contrast, the null hypothesis of structural stability 
in the remaining equations is not rejected.  
Table 4 - Andrews-Quandt breakpoint tests for SFAVAR coefficients 
All coefficients Global liquidity Global GDP Global house prices
FAVAR equations Date Max LR F Date Max LR F Date Max LR F Date Max LR F
Global GDP 1990 Q2  3.88 1988 Q2 8.09 1990 Q2 4.72 1990 Q2 6.48
Global inflation 2001 Q3 3.73 1990 Q3 3.32 1990 Q3 3.73 2001Q3 3.17
Commodity prices 1996 Q2 2.92 1998 Q1 2.90 1990 Q3 2.83 1999Q2 1.99
Global house prices 1991 Q3 3.17 1989 Q2 5.46 1989 Q2 8.05 1989Q2 5.26
Global liquidity 1997 Q3 5.46 1990 Q3 19.10*** 1990 Q3 20.11*** 1990 Q3 17.24***
Global 3M interest rates 1988 Q3 4.53 1988 Q3 8.08 1988 Q3 8.78 1988 Q3 3.66
Global share prices 1999 Q4 2.40 2002 Q2 8.50 1995 Q2 9.11 2002 Q2 11.11*
Note 1: Heteroskedasticity-robust version of Maximum LR test for 'propagation'
Note 2: *** Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level  
Due to our trimming exercise, 15 percent of the sample period gets lost both at the 
start and the end of the sample period. Hence, the most recent years from 2004 to 2007 in 
the run-up to the global financial crisis are excluded from the Andrews-Quandt tests 
above. As an alternative for detecting structural breaks, we opted for estimating the 
following dummy approach (Boivin and Giannoni, 2008):  
(11)    t t t
d
t t G F d L F L F         1 1 ) ( ) (
where   takes the value 0 for the period Q1 1984 – Q4 2001 and 1 afterwards. 
The coefficients on the global factors are equal to 
t d
) (L   for Q1 1984 – Q4 2001 and to 
 thereafter. We regard our dummy approach as an interesting alternative to 
the data-consuming Andrews-Quandt tests. Accordingly, the effects of global liquidity 
shocks have seemingly become stronger from 2002 to 2007. Interestingly, the most 
pronounced impact can be found on global house prices. After three quarters, the effect of 
a global liquidity shock gets stronger and more persistent in comparison to the baseline 
SFAVAR. On average, the impact on global house prices from Q3 to Q20 increases by 
50%. We take this as a first indication that the propagation mechanism in the global 
economy may have changed in recent years and the importance of global money supply 
shocks has risen. In addition, global demand shocks have also played a more important 
role as the impact on inflation has risen.  
) ( ) ( L L
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In the next step, we examine the stability of the global structural shocks. Under 
the null hypothesis that there is no break in the variance,  | ) ( |  t E
| ) ( |
 is constant. We 
therefore test for a break by implementing the Quandt-Andrews test in the regression of 
  t  against a constant, using homoskedastic standard errors (which are valid under 
the null). Accordingly, apart from the short-term interest rate innovations, there is no 
indication of sharp structural breaks. The estimated break date for global interest rate 
shocks is Q1 1991. Given that such a sharp break may still be part of an ongoing trend, 
we additionally test for more gradual changes in the global short-term interest rate 
shocks. The regression is augmented with a time trend (Stock, Watson 2002). The null 
hypothesis of no sharp break is not rejected again. The coefficient sign of time trend is 
significantly negative, thereby reflecting that the magnitude of the shocks is decreasing 
over time. -30- 
 
Table 5 - Andrews-Quandt breakpoint tests for SFAVAR shocks 
Global structural shocks Date Max LR F Max LR F (trend)
GDP 1988 Q2 6.20 ---
Inflation 1998 Q4 2.40 ---
Commodity prices 1988 Q4 3.01 ---
House prices 1991 Q3 5.95 ---
Monetary liquidity 2003 Q4 2.99 ---
3M interest rates 1991 Q1 18.65*** 6.62 (–)
Share prices 1991 Q2 3.41 ---
Note 1: Sign of trend, if significant, in parentheses
Note 2: *** Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level  
The same procedure is repeated for factor loadings in order to examine whether 
the transmission mechanism between global factors and national variables has changed 
over time. The lag length in the lag polynomial   is set uniformly to two which is 
sufficient to avoid autocorrelation.
) (L D
10 15 of the 30 implemented Andrews-Quandt 
breakpoint tests indicate a sharp break in the respective factor loading on the basis of 
conventional significance levels. Especially prone to instability is the relation between 
global and national GDP with breaks in the US, the EMU, Japan and the UK. Only in 
Canada can no structural variation be found.  
The relations between global factors and national variables are also unstable with 
respect to money and house prices with three of five possible breaks each. It is important 
to note that the breaks typically do not occur at approximately the same time across 
countries. For example, the break between global and EMU money is in Q2 1994, 
whereas it is in Q1 2002 for the US. The same irregular pattern can also be found for 
house prices and GDP. In our view, this argues against a big bang in economic and 
financial globalization with the G-7 countries and the euro zone influenced by global 
forces at approximately the same time. Instead, the global factors seemingly started 
influencing national variables differently at various points in time.  
                                                 
10 The results prove to be robust when different lag specifications are tried.  -31- 
 
Table 6 - Andrews-Quandt breakpoint tests for factor loadings 
Relation between ... US EMU Japan UK Canada
global and national GDP 12.63*** (1994 Q4) 10.45** (1990 Q2) 11.55** (1989 Q3) 8.37* (1995 Q2) 2.40 (2000 Q2)
global inflation and national CPI 4.53 (2003 Q4) 0.81 (1989 Q2) 5.88 (1994 Q1) 7.59* (1990 Q3) 5.87 (1988 Q2)
global and national house prices 62.79*** (2004 Q1) 2.38 (1988 Q4) 9.52** (1991 Q2) 1.91 (1990 Q1) 18.77*** (1999 Q1)
global and national money 9.67** (2001 Q1) 14.81*** (1994 Q2) 8.02* (1992 Q4) 2.03 (1997 Q3) 3.42 (1999 Q1)
global and national 3M interest rates 14.07*** (2001 Q1) 4.81 (1992 Q4) 1.22 (2001 Q3) 14.38*** (1993 Q2) 3.41 (1990 Q1)
global and national share prices 2.78 (1998 Q4) 5.45 (1990 Q3) 5.91 (1992 Q3) 7.19* (1994 Q3) 9.94** (1993 Q4)
Note 1: Heteroskedasticity-robust version of Maximum LR test 
Note 2: *** Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level  
However, as already noted, the Andrews-Quandt test focuses on rather simple 
one-off breaks. Such an assumption is not justified, if gradual changes in coefficients and 
residuals occur. In addition, there can be temporary outbursts of volatility. Tests for a 
single change in volatility are then misleading, as the one-off break will be dated either at 
the beginning or at the end of the extremely volatile time period. We therefore estimate 
rolling regressions for factor loadings, concentrating on GDP, money and house prices. 
Given that our sample covers a comparatively short time span of 24 years, we opted for a 
rolling 12-year window.  
Selected results can be found in the following charts in which the solid line equals 
the factor loading and the two dashed lines are the 95 percent intervals obtained by a 
simple residual bootstrap with 500 draws (see also Tables A3 to A5 in the Appendix). For 
example, the figures for Q1 2000 are the results based on the rolling regression from Q1 
1988 to Q4 1999. A clear-cut pattern across countries and variables does not emerge. In 
some cases, the factor loadings increase over time, in some not or even decline. 
Concerning global liquidity, the factor loading for EMU M3 more than doubles, whereas 
the impact on US M2 also rises but less markedly. The same diverse pattern also holds 
for the relation between national and global GDP and national and global house prices, 
respectively. 
Interestingly enough, US variables in general seem to be influenced increasingly 
by common forces. For example, the US factor loadings both for global GDP and house 
prices have risen significantly. However, at this point, it is not clear whether the US has 
really become more prone to influences from abroad. We will deal with this issue in the 
next chapter by conducting several robustness checks.
11 In contrast, the effect from 
                                                 
11 Given the fact that our common forces for money, GDP and house prices are estimated on the basis of 
only five variables, the reverse causality may hold, i.e. development in the US has recently become more 
important for the global economy.  -32- 
 
globalization on national GDP seems to have diminished for such a small economy like 
Canada. Not surprisingly, national developments also play a more important role in the 
case of Japan, given the special circumstances after the bursting of the housing and equity 
bubble at the beginning of the 1990s. 








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007













1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Global house price -> Japan house price
 -33- 
 
5.4. Robustness checks 
We apply three robustness checks in order to test whether our results hold in general 
independent of variations in the specification. One important robustness check is the 
“cross-sectional” stability of the global forces. In dynamic factor analysis, it is usually 
assumed that the cross-sectional dimension of the dataset is large, even possibly larger 
than the temporal dimension. Hence, the exclusion of one country or variable should not 
influence the results markedly. However, this may not be true in our approach, since we 
focus on a rather limited set of countries (G-7 countries plus euro zone) often with only 
one variable per country. For example, for broad monetary liquidity, a total of five figures 
are used (M2 in the US and Canada, M2CD in Japan, M3 in the EMU and M4 in the UK) 
to estimate the common monetary liquidity force. The same is true for other variables, 
like house and share prices or GDP. It is therefore conceivable that the exclusion of one 
variable may significantly alter the results received from principal component analysis.  
In order to assess how vulnerable our results are, we estimate each global variable 
excluding one country. Afterwards, the co-movement between the global force including 
all five countries and the global force based on four countries is estimated. If the 
correlation coefficient does not change markedly, it is concluded that the global variable 
is symmetric, i.e. it is not overly influenced by one country. Our results indicate that this 
is the case, as the co-movement is comparatively high. Interestingly, this is even true 
when the US is excluded from the dataset. This may point in the direction that the global 
economy may be less asymmetrically influenced by the US than usually thought. 
However, it is important to stress that a simple correlation analysis cannot distinguish 
between shocks and propagation.  
Table 7 - Co-movement between global force and global force ex respective country 
Global force excluding ... GDP Inflation House prices Liquidity 3M interest rate Share price
US 0.90*** 0.95*** 0.91*** 0.98*** 0.93*** 0.99***
EMU 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.81*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.99***
Japan 1.00*** 0.98*** 0.99*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.99***
UK 0.93*** 0.97*** 0.86*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.99***
Canada 0.86*** 0.99*** 0.81*** 0.96*** 0.93*** 0.99***
Note 1: Correlation coefficients
Note 2: *** Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level  -34- 
 
Another robustness check is the estimate of alternative versions of our SFAVAR. 
First, we change the lag length from two to four lags with little consequences for our 
results. Global liquidity, house and GDP shocks remain driving forces of the world 
economy. In addition, we use different assumptions for identifying the global structural 
shocks. In contrast to equation (5), we assume that the global short-term interest rate 
reacts contemporaneously to global GDP and inflation but not to commodity prices, 
global house prices and global liquidity. This change seems to be the most obvious one 
for us, since monetary policy may have knowledge of the development of GDP and 
inflation within the quarter. The impulse response functions in the FAVAR remained 
very stable, apart from the responses after a global liquidity shock for which we find 
some changes. For example, the common inflation factor rose significantly without any 
time delay, thereby not being in line with economic theory. We interpret this result as 
confirmation of our chosen identification strategy.  
6. Policy conclusions 
In this contribution, we have investigated whether there is increasing uncertainty for 
monetary policy in the wake of globalization and whether central banks have become less 
effective in influencing national liquidity conditions. In brief, our answer to both 
questions is a clear “yes”. Hence, we feel legitimized to derive at least four policy 
conclusions emerging from our analysis. First, global liquidity conveys additional 
information about monetary conditions not summarized by national money and short-
term interest rates. Second, global liquidity restricts national monetary policy in its ability 
to influence nominal and real variables, caused by, for example, the effect of global 
liquidity on short-term interest rates. As a consequence, the influence of central banks on 
domestic money supply is weakening. Third, national monetary policy is faced with an 
increasing degree of uncertainty and might feel forced to act according to the so-called 
Brainard conservatism principle. Fourth, the old question of optimal monetary policy 
among interdependent economies powerfully reappears on the surface. In the following, 
we elaborate a bit more on the third and the fourth policy conclusion. 
Our third policy conclusion is that national monetary policy is faced with an 
increasing degree of uncertainty. Needless to say, monetary policy always operates in an -35- 
 
environment of uncertainty. Sometimes, for instance, it is not unambiguously clear for 
central banks how to interpret new incoming macroeconomic data. Moreover, there are 
uncertainties about the concise monetary transmission mechanism. However, our 
empirical results indicate that the fog of uncertainty has indeed become denser due to 
structural changes in the transmission process between global and national variables. 
Among other common forces, this seems to be also true for global liquidity, which has an 
increasingly stronger effect on monetary aggregates in some but not all countries. This 
“Knightian uncertainty” or model uncertainty may have significant implications for the 
behavior of central banks.  
According to the Brainard conservatism principle, uncertainties about major 
model parameters can change the incentives facing central bankers, thereby leading them 
to use their policy instruments less vigorously. The reason is that uncertainties about the 
elasticity between global and national money is amplified into the economy the more 
monetary policy reacts to this relation. Since the Brainard conservatism introduces a 
motive for caution in optimal central bank behavior, financial globalization and its 
corresponding structural changes may be important reasons for central banks not fighting 
against strong rises in monetary and credit aggregates in the last few years.  
In contrast, Borio and Filardo (2007) explain excessive monetary policy 
accommodation not by rising uncertainties but by favorable supply side developments 
triggered by globalization. This in turn dampened inflationary pressure and allowed the 
reduction of short-term interest rates to exceptionally low levels. If structural breaks and 
the higher potential for making mistakes make up for the underlying reasons for too 
prudent central banks behavior, it is not clear whether this will change in the years to 
come. Both financial markets and the global economy may undergo even more profound 
modifications after the unprecedented financial crisis.  
Our fourth policy conclusion concerns the question of the optimal design of 
monetary policy among interdependent economies. Should open “spillover-driven” 
economies adopt rules designed to fit specific features of more open and more closed 
economies? This is old wine in new bottles and is closely related to the popular debates -36- 
 
about inward-looking versus outward-looking monetary policy and commitment versus 
discretion, respectively. 
The Chicago School saw a flexible exchange rate as a way of insulating domestic 
developments from foreign economic disturbances, including foreign monetary policy. 
There is no need, they argued, for central banks to coordinate their monetary policies. All 
that is needed is flexible exchange rates. Does the existence of global liquidity mean that 
we need coordination or even a world central bank? International coordination might be 
needed to keep global liquidity shocks as low as possible, since structural changes 
between global and national liquidity cannot be influenced by central banks. One reason 
is that monetary competition between central banks might cause a free-rider problem 
without any coordination. If a national central bank, let’s say the Bank of Japan, is 
inclined to conduct a lax monetary policy, liquidity spillovers occur and foreign central 
banks have to bear parts of the burden. Another reason is that there may be multiplier 
effects that occur when several countries all turn their monetary policy in the same 
direction. The crucial issue is how best to prevent further excessive, synchronized shifts 
in the world money stock. However, policy coordination would bring greater 
predictability, but at the risk of all countries simultaneously choosing the wrong set of 
policies. International policy coordination would merely elevate to the global level the 
shortcomings that are now apparent at the domestic level. 
While we have come up with some additional empirical evidence supporting the 
view that monetary policy has become less effective as a consequence of globalization, 
the question remains unsolved whether central banks need to adapt their monetary policy 
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In order to display the data sources, we have chosen the following format: series number; 
data span, series description; original source and database provider. 
 ---------  Monetary  aggregates 
1  1984:1-2007:4  US money supply M2   Federal Reserve Board  Feri 
2  1984:1-2007:4  EMU money supply M3  OECD  Feri 
3  1984:1-2007:4  Japan money supply M2 plus 
cash deposits 
Bank of Japan  Feri 
4  1984:1-2007:4  UK money supply M4  OECD  Feri 
5  1984:1-2007:4  Canada money supply M2  Bank of Canada  Bloomberg 
  
 ---------  GDP 
6  1984:1-2007:4  US real GDP  Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Feri 
7  1984:1-2007:4  EMU real GDP  ECB, Eurostat  ECB, Feri 
8  1984:1-2007:4  Japan real GDP  Economic and Social 
Research Institute 
Feri 
9  1984:1-2007:4  UK real GDP  Office for National 
Statistics 
Feri 
10  1984:1-2007:4  Canada real GDP  Statistics Canada  Feri 
  
 ---------  Short-term interest rates 
11  1984:1-2007:4  Yield 3M US treasury bill  Federal Reserve Board  Feri 
12  1984:1-2007:4  3M EMU interbank rate  ECB  ECB, Feri 
13  1984:1-2007:4  Yield 2M Japanese treasury bill 
until 1995, afterwards 3M 
interbank rate 
Japanese Bankers 
Association, Bank of 
Japan 
Bank of Japan, Feri 
14  1984:1-2007:4  Yield 3M UK treasury bill  Bank of England  Feri 
15  1984:1-2007:4  Yield 3M Canada treasury bill  Bank of Canada  Feri -xviii- 
 
  
 ---------  Inflation 
16  1984:1-2007:4  US consumer prices  Bureau of Labor Statistics  Feri 
17  1984:1-2007:4  EMU consumer prices  ECB, Eurostat  ECB, Feri 
18  1984:1-2007:4  Japan consumer prices  Japanese Statistics Bureau  Feri 
19  1984:1-2007:4  UK consumer prices  Office for National 
Statistics 
Feri 
20  1984:1-2007:4  Canada consumer prices  Statistics Canada  Feri 
21  1984:1-2007:4  GDP deflator  Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
ECB, Feri 
22  1984:1-2007:4  GDP deflator  ECB, Feri  ECB, Feri 
23  1984:1-2007:4  GDP deflator  Economic and Social 
Research Institute 
Feri 
24  1984:1-2007:4  GDP deflator  Office for National 
Statistics 
Feri 
25 1984:1-2007:4 GDP  deflator  Statistics  Canada  Feri 
26  1984:1-2007:4  Import prices  Bureau of Labor Statistics  Feri 
27  1984:1-2007:4  Import prices  ECB, Eurostat  ECB, Feri 
28  1984:1-2007:4  Import prices  Bank of Japan  Feri 
29 1984:1-2007:4 Import  prices  IMF  Feri 
30  1984:1-2007:4  Import prices  Statistics Canada  Feri 
31  1984:1-2007:4  Producer prices  Bureau of Labor Statistics  Feri 
32 1984:1-2007:4 Producer  prices  Eurostat  Feri 
33 1984:1-2007:4 Producer  prices  Bloomberg  Bloomberg 
34 1984:1-2007:4 Producer  prices  OECD  Feri 
35  1984:1-2007:4  Producer prices  Statistics Canada  Feri 
  -xix- 
 
  --------- Exchange rate 
36 1984:1-2007:4 US  real  effective exchange rate 
(CPI based) 
OECD Feri 
37 1984:1-2007:4 EMU  real effective exchange 
rate (CPI based) 
OECD Feri 
38  1984:1-2007:4  Japan real effective exchange 
rate (CPI based) 
OECD Feri 
39  1984:1-2007:4  UK real effective exchange rate 
(CPI based) 
OECD Feri 
40  1984:1-2007:4  Canada real effective exchange 
rate (CPI based) 
OECD Feri 
  
 ---------  Share  prices 
41  1984:1-2007:4  US MSCI share price index 
(local currency based) 
Morgan Stanley Capital 
International 
Feri 
42  1984:1-2007:4  EMU MSCI share price index 
(local currency based) 
Morgan Stanley Capital 
International 
Feri 
43  1984:1-2007:4  Japan MSCI share price index 
(local currency based) 
Morgan Stanley Capital 
International 
Feri 
44  1984:1-2007:4  UK MSCI share price index 
(local currency based) 
Morgan Stanley Capital 
International 
Feri 
45  1984:1-2007:4  Canada MSCI share price 
index (local currency based) 




  --------- House prices 
46  1984:1-2007:4  US house prices  National Association of 
Realtors 
Datastream 
47  1984:1-2007:4  EMU house prices  Gros, various national 
sources 
Gros, Datastream 
48  1984:1-2007:4  Japan house prices  Gros, Japan Real Estate 
Institute 
Gros, Bloomberg -xx- 
 
49  1984:1-2007:4  UK house prices  Nationwide Building 
Society 
Bloomberg 
50  1984:1-2007:4  Canada house prices  Gros, OECD  Gros, Datastream 
  
  --------- Commodity prices 
51  1984:1-2007:4  CRB commodity futures index 
on US dollar basis 
CRB Feri 
52  1984:1-2007:4  CRB commodity futures index 
on EUR basis 
CRB, own calculations  Feri 
53  1984:1-2007:4  CRB commodity futures index 
on JPY basis 
CRB, own calculations  Feri 
54  1984:1-2007:4  CRB commodity futures index 
on GBP basis 
CRB, own calculations  Feri 
55  1984:1-2007:4  CRB commodity futures index 
on CAD basis 
CRB, own calculations  Feri 
56  1984:1-2007:4  HWWI commodity price index
on US dollar basis 
HWWI Feri 
57  1984:1-2007:4  HWWI commodity price index 
on EUR basis 
HWWI, own calculations  Feri 
58  1984:1-2007:4  HWWI commodity price index
on JPY basis 
HWWI, own calculations  Feri 
59  1984:1-2007:4  HWWI commodity price index
on GBP basis 
HWWI, own calculations  Feri 
60  1984:1-2007:4  HWWI commodity price index 
on CAD basis 
HWWI, own calculations  Feri 
        
 ---------  Long-term interest rates 
61  1984:1-2007:4  10Y government bond yield, 
US 
Federal Reserve Board  Feri 
62  1984:1-2007:4  10Y government bond yield,  Eurostat  Feri -xxi- 
 
EMU, 
63  1984:1-2007:4  Government bond yield 
average maturity, Japan 
Bank of Japan  Feri 
64  1984:1-2007:4  10Y government bond yield, 
UK 
OECD Feri 
65  1984:1-2007:4  10Y government bond yield, 
Canada 
Bank of Canada  Feri 
        
  --------- Hours worked 
66  1984:1-2007:4  Hours worked total economy, 
US, 
OECD, own calculations  Feri 
67  1984:1-2007:4  Hours worked total economy, 
EMU 
OECD, own calculations  Feri 
68  1984:1-2007:4  Hours worked total economy, 
Japan 
OECD, own calculations  Feri 
69  1984:1-2007:4  Hours worked total economy, 
UK 
OECD, own calculations  Feri 
70  1984:1-2007:4  Hours worked total economy, 
Canada 
OECD, own calculations  Feri 
 